Purpose -Twofold: first, to review the literature in order to assess the opportunities and the possible welfare effects of differentiation strategies in the food market; second, to analyse the current structure and organisation of the fresh produce market (fruit, vegetable, and salad) in the light of new product procurement, innovation, and differentiation policies carried out by retailers at the global level.
Introduction
The current differentiation strategies in the fresh produce (fruit, vegetable, and salad) industry are analysed in the light of new procurement policies carried out by retailers at the global level. These retailers pay growing attention to product differentiation and innovation as a means to put new value (rather than simply ripping out costs) into the supply chain.
Differentiation strategies are analysed. On a theoretical level, the main findings of the literature on product differentiation and market structure are reviewed in order to assess the opportunities and the possible welfare effects of differentiation strategies in the food market.
On an empirical level, the current structure and organisation of the fresh produce market are analysed, using both data at the aggregate level and the findings of a case study. The case study refers to a single dyadic case approach, in which a primary producer is engaged in 'partner' supply to a principal category management intermediary for channel leading multiple retailers.
The findings of the study indicate that in the fresh produce industry there are good opportunities for successful differentiation strategies. Nevertheless, actors at the different vertical stages of the marketing channel take very different advantage from it, depending on their 'power' to lead the channel. Moreover, the fact that product differentiation tends to foster the oligopolistic structure of the market might have general negative welfare effects.
Product Differentiation and Market Structure
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Differentiation strategies are pervasive in market economies and are a powerful means of obtaining competitive advantages. This is because the 'master' of competitive advantage offers superior value which "stems from offering lower prices than competitors for equivalent benefits; or providing unique benefits that more than offset a higher price" (Porter, 1985: p. 3). Firms create value by cost leadership or differentiation (Porter, 1985) . Using the latter strategy, firms differentiate their product to avoid ruinous price competition and seek some form of monopoly rent. Differentiation offers firms market power, naturally resolving the Bertrand paradox (whereby two undifferentiated players reduce price in order to capture the market but find themselves in a state of Nash equilibrium-without profit).
The industrial economic literature focuses on the effects of differentiation strategies on market structure, firms' performances, and welfare effects (Beath and Katsoulacos, 1991) . A basic tenet is the distinction made between horizontal and vertical differentiation. Products are said to be horizontally differentiated when, if offered at the same price, consumers, if asked to do so, would rank them differently showing different preferences for different varieties. Instead, they are said to be vertically differentiated if, when offered at the same price, all consumer choose to purchase the same one, that of highest quality.
Horizontal and vertical differentiation leads to quite different general results in terms of market structure. Horizontal differentiation is the implicit assumption at the core of models of monopolistic competition and have basically given rise to two classes of models based on the assumption of symmetric consumer preferences (or representative consumer) and asymmetric preferences. In the case of symmetric preferences, one brand is an equally good substitute for any other and the consumer's actual choice will depend on income and relative prices. When preferences are asymmetric, brands are not all equally substitute: if a consumer's ideal brand 6 is i then the consumer prefers brands that are 'near' to i in terms of his specification (i.e., in the space of product characteristics in the Lancaster lessicon; more than those that are 'far' from it). Asymmetric preferences are assumed in location models, whereas symmetric preferences are assumed in models grounded in the Chamberlin paradigm.
The simplest and seminal location model is the Hotelling model of a spatial duopoly, sanctioning the famous principle of minimum differentiation. Successive studies have shown that the Nash equilibrium in the Hotelling model relies on its restrictive assumption, as the zero conjectural variation assumption and the prices and the number of firms being fixed exogenously. When these assumptions are relaxed a unique Nash equilibrium does not necessarily occurs. D'apremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) , for example, starting from a different assumption on the initial location of the firms, show that the Hotelling model allows for a solution where the sellers seek to move as far away from each other as possible. In the free-entry circular model of Salop (1979) equilibrium is found where each firm earns zero profits and firms are symmetrically located around the circumference of the circle.
The Chamberlin (1933) large group model leads to the classical long-run monopolistic equilibrium, the one in which profits are zero and the 'dd' curve is tangential to the average cost curve. As long as the 'dd' curve that each firm faces still has some negative slope, each firm will produce at a point above the level of minimum average cost. Models postulating horizontal differentiation generally back equilibria characterised by many firms earning zero profits and prices above marginal costs. These models raise the question of whether the market will produce too many or too few brands as compared with the social optimal, which is the issue previously addressed by Spence (1976) . The result is generally a suboptimal number of firms/products, with too many or too few firms in the Chamberlin representative 7 consumer model (depending on the parameters of the model) and unambiguously too much variety in the localized competition circle model. While a perfect equilibrium is often problematic in the horizontal case, a perfect equilibrium exists in the vertical case consistent with the finiteness property, and stating that at the equilibrium there is a limit to the number of products for which price can exceed unit variable cost and which have a positive share of the market. The finiteness property was introduced by Shaked and Sutton (1983) . The markets in which this is a feature of equilibrium are referred to as natural oligopolies. In the model of Shaked and Sutton, the two conditions that the unit variable costs associated with increased quality rise more slowly than consumers' willingness to pay for this and that the main burden of quality improvement falls on fixed rather than variable costs. An important development of the previous model of Shaked and Sutton (1987) is the one that demonstrates that a weak version of the finiteness property still holds when a mix of horizontal and vertical differentiation is accounted for (that is the pervasive situation in the real world where product differentiation never falls under the ideal type of vertical or horizontal).
Summarising, differentiation is always a source of market imperfection and welfare loss. In the case of pure horizontal differentiation these effects are mainly linked to inefficient scales of production or to the suboptimal product variety, whereas the market structure approaches the competitive one. In the vertical (or mixed) case the negative welfare effects are linked to the oligopolistic structure emerging as market equilibrium. The limit theorems describing horizontal differentiation state that in the limit as the market gets large enough, an arbitrary large number of firms, each with a very small market share could co-exist in equilibrium. 8 When carrying out differentiation policies, firms will be earning supernormal profits even though the competitive game is based on the assumptions of non cooperative Bertrand behaviour and free-entry. This result is in contrast to both structure-conduct-performance paradigm and entry-deterrence theory, and is an example of case where structure (the number of the firms) and performance are endogenously determined.
Differentiation and Channel Strategies in the Food Sector
The economic literature just mentioned refers to the analysis of one industry at time, that is, on the analysis of competition and market structure at the horizontal level (inter-brand competition). In the food sector the set of prices, qualities, and varieties that actually face the final consumers depends on the strategies carried out by different actors in different stages of the distribution channel. These strategies are the results of horizontal as well as vertical competition. Vertical competition has traditionally been addressed by the channel literature modelling different channel structure in a manufacturer-retailer relationship. Traditionally, three ideal types of structure have been considered (Choi, 1996) : exclusive dealer channel (one manufacturer supplying one retailer); monopoly common retailer channel (two manufacturers supplying the same unique retailer); monopoly manufacturer channel (a unique manufacturer supplying two retailers); and duopoly common retailer channel (two manufacturers both supplying two retailers).
The topic of channel literature has been the analysis of channel coordination/control problems between the manufacturers and its retailers and on the analysis of vertical strategic interaction; this latter defined in terms of "the direction of channel member's reaction to the action of its channel partners within a given demand structure" (Lee and Staelin, 1997: p. 9 185). Previous literature, taking for granted the bargaining power of manufacturers, has focused on the incentive schemes used by manufacturers in order to let the retailers choose the strategies able to maximize the channel total profit, while appropriating the largest share of it. Choi (1991) , for example, quotes the different forms of governance for the achievement of the maximum channel profit. Because such studies have generally been applied to nongrocery sectors with few national brands and frequent exclusive selling agreement, the problems of channel coordination with regards to differentiating besides pricing behaviours in a multi/manufacturer multi/retailer setting (that is the typical channel setting for the food industry), have been paid little attention. Starting with the previous insights of Choi (1991) , successive works have explicitly addressed the problem of channel coordination and differentiation in grocery sectors (Avenel and Caprice, 2006; Choi, 1996; Choi and Couglan, 2006; Ellickson, 2004; Lee and Staelin, 1997) . While the first and the third game applies to situations in which few powerful manufacturers (retailers) supply (buy from) many retailers (manufacturers), the second game fits a situation where power is quite balanced in the relationship. Choi solves these models under both the assumption of linearity and nonlinearity of the demand function, finding contradictory results. Moreover, he solves the models under different assumption on the degree of product substitutability between the manufacturers' brands, in such a way as to introduce the analysis of the effect of product differentiation on channel competition. Also in this case the results are affected by the form of the demand function; with contradictory results (for instance he finds that less differentiation leads to increased prices and profits for all the members of the channel). Choi (1996) extends the previous model by introducing a differentiated duopoly common retailer channel. He analyses pricing strategies of duopoly manufacturers who produce differentiated products and duopoly retailers who sell both products and carry out store differentiation strategies. Both product and store differentiation are assumed to be horizontal and, like the previous work, three games are considered (vertical Nash, manufacturer Stackelberg, and retailer Stackelberg). The assumed demand function is adjusted in such a way as to explicitly take into account the two differentiation levels (introducing two parameters, for the product and store differentiation) and to overcome the contradictory results of the previous model as regard profit channel and differentiation. The Stackelberg games are quite different from the previous article because, besides the vertical competition, two horizontal levels of competition must be modelled; the manufacturer level and the retailer level. Accordingly, the equilibrium concept employed is the sub game-perfect 11 Stackelberg equilibrium. Results attained by the model are summarised in the following seven propositions (Choi, 1996: pp. 125-129) :
 A Stackelberg channel leadership by either manufacturer or retailer results in higher retail prices than those of the Nash game.
 Given a set of differentiation parameters, a channel member benefits by playing the Stackelberg leader at the expense of the other channel member who becomes the follower.
 Total channel profit is larger when there is no channel leadership. However, vertical Nash is not a stable structure, because each channel member has an incentive to become a leader.
 Wholesale prices (retail margins) increase as products (stores) are more differentiated. On the other hand, wholesale prices (retail margins) decrease as stores (products) are more differentiated. Overall, retail prices increase as products and stores are more differentiated.
 Product (store) differentiation benefits manufacturers (retailers), but at the same time hurts retailers (manufacturers). Therefore, manufacturers want more product differentiation and less store differentiation, while the retailers want the reverse.
 Product (store) differentiation and the manufacturer (retailer) Stackelberg leadership have positive synergy effect on the manufacturer (retailer) profits.
 The total profit-maximizing combinations of product and store differentiations are not stable because each channel member has an incentive to differentiate unilaterally.
These results are consistent with the general wisdom that differentiation is used to mitigate price competition and that it tends to produce negative welfare effects. In the analysed case the combined vertical-horizontal competition produces non-stable equilibria that fail to maximise the total channel profit as consequence of the conflicting interests of retailers and manufacturers, and therefore opening the question whether a cooperative solution could lead 12 to welfare improvements. Moreover, the sketched channel structure fits the current situation of food marketing channels, either for the double level of differentiation or for vertical power asymmetry that pushes towards non-cooperative vertical forms of coordination, where both parties seek to take the leadership (and retailers actually seem to accomplish it).
Avenel and Caprice (2006) model a vertical structure with a vertically differentiated duopoly at the manufacturer level and two retailers who differentiate through the chosen product line (i.e., each of them sell one or both the high and the low quality offered by manufacturers).
The focus is on the analysis of the effects of different vertical contractual arrangements on product line differentiation, given different setting of vertical strategic interaction and different levels of costs for quality. Even if this model seems to better apply to the nongrocery sector (in that the assumption of manufacturer channel as leader and the kind of contractual arrangement that are examined, that is, exclusive dealing, vertical integration, and franchise fee), it can be of some interest for those segments of food market, such as the new functional and nutraceutical products, that imply a vertical differentiation strategy fed by heavy sunk investments in research and development by powerful food companies. Choi and Couglan (2006) investigate the positioning problem of private labels considering the differentiation strategies carried out by national brands, and the consequent product-line pricing strategies carried out by the retailer. They model a manufacturer Stackelberg game where the manufacturer determines the wholesale price and the quality level of his national brand and the retailer chose:
 The optimal level of vertical differentiation of her store brand from the national brand.
 The degree of substitutability between the national and the store brand.
 The retail margin for the national brands.
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 The price of the store brand.
The equilibrium concept is a sub-game perfect equilibrium in which the second stage price equilibrium is reached immediately after the differentiation decisions. In order to simultaneously take into account the effect of horizontal and vertical differentiation the demand function used in the model is derived from a consumer utility function that contains a preference parameters for each product (vertical differentiation) and a parameter measuring the degree of substitutability with respect to other products. The results of the model for the case of two national brands and one store brand suggest that if the quality levels of the two national brands are equal and they are substantially horizontally differentiated, imitating either brand is optimal for the private label. However, when the national brands are allowed to be vertical differentiated, the private label is better off imitating the higher quality brand.
Positioning in between is never an optimal solution. In contrast, when the two national brands are horizontally undifferentiated the private label better response is to horizontally differentiate from both national brands. A consequence of these results is that the more the national brands differentiate, the more store brands carry out imitative strategies leading to head-to-head competition that pushes national brands towards further differentiation and/or advertising investments. Because high differentiation and advertising investment are sources of market power, these findings are consistent with that store brand literature that have suggested that the anticompetitive effects of store brands can be greater than the competitive ones (Cotteril and Putsis, 2000; Parker, 1997, 1999) .
To complete this short review of the main findings attained so far from the literature on differentiation and marketing channels, it is worth quoting a recent study by Ellickson (2006) who empirically applies Sutton's theory of endogenous sunk cost and vertical differentiation 14 to the supermarket industry in the US. During the 1980s and 1990s, the consolidation process in this industry has been driven by the introduction of innovative automated distribution and procurement systems. If one assumes that the level of concentration is determined by the economies of scale and scope associated with these innovations, as markets grow (and these economies are exploited) the level of concentration should decrease. In contrast, in about 50 spatially defined markets in the US, the evidence is of a stable small number of firms (three to six) capturing the majority of the market, independent of the population; with a competitive fringe of smaller retailers capturing a minor share of the market (Ellickson, 2006) . Ellickson (2006) builds and tests a model demonstrating that such a structure is a real 'natural oligopoly' stemming from a competitive game among the leader firms based on a growing vertical differentiation associated with increasing sunk costs. In his model, supermarkets compete by offering a greater variety of products (where variety is considered as a purely vertical form of product differentiation). This implies larger stores and therefore larger sunk costs that discourage entry by other firms. As a consequence, quality provided by the oligopolists (proxied by store size) should increase with the size of the market. In other terms high concentration and escalation in quality seem to be both characteristic features of the supermarket industry.
Differentiation Opportunities in the Market for Fresh Produce
The previous section has shown how, in order to maintain their competitive advantage, firms continuously increase their quality effort, either in the horizontal competitive game (manufacturers-to-manufacturers and retailers-to-retailers) or in the vertical competitive game (manufacturers-to-retailers). Once a differentiation strategy has initiated, it continues through time, especially when a quality (vertical) more than a feature (horizontal) differentiation is 15 involved. Consistent with the general findings of the economic theory, the channel literature suggests that vertical differentiation, more than the horizontal one, tends to be associated with a high degree of industry concentration and market power (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002; White, 2000) . In any case, the equilibria (prices and market structures) at any level of the channel depend on a complex interplay between strategies carried out at horizontal and at vertical level; power asymmetries between upstream and downstream firms; and the kinds of governance structures along the channel (Hingley, 2005a) .
With regards to the fresh produce sector, at least three hints can be drawn on these general findings described:
 The sector of fresh produce offers retailers a wide range of possibilities to increase product variety, and therefore it can be a core category in the differentiating efforts carried out by supermarkets in the horizontal competitive arena. Examples of fresh produce variety improvement are: new format and packaging; standards  as organic, fair trade, non GMO, and so on; longer shelf life through bio and nano technologies or enhanced storage and handling systems; improved technological foods, such as functional and nutraceutical; IV Gamma products, de-seasonality, (i.e., making seasonal products available throughout the year); typical products with an origin denomination; and ethnic products.
 Because the main fresh produce suppliers do not generally have their own supplier brand, in their differentiating strategies retailers do not have to take into account strategic reactions by the upstream counterparties; and hence are more able to entirely appropriate the competitive advantage stemming from the differentiation.
 Because of the general weakness of the fresh produce sector structure, retailers can easily assume the leadership of the channel and therefore impose transaction governance forms that can accomplish the following goals: maximizing the channel profit; giving themselves 16 the power of appropriating the larger share of the profit; and leading suppliers to comply with retailers' differentiating strategies without a real vertical contractual integration.
Fresh Produce Markets and Distribution in the UK and Italy
The multiple chain retailers dominate the market for fresh produce in the UK; they have the biggest market share in fresh fruit and vegetables providing 84 per cent of all UK retail sales (Mintel, 2005) . There is steady growth in value sales of fresh produce in the UK, which marks it out against a general decline in most food commodities. This trend partly reflects the changing shopping habits of UK consumers, but is also driven by the proactive role the supermarkets have taken. The multiples are keen to develop their profile as suppliers of healthy eating products, but are also using various strategies to drive interest in the fresh sector, such as introducing exclusive new varieties or introducing new packaging. Mintel (2005) identify 'interest in fresh produce source and origin' from consumers, but, however, note that price most often determines purchase decisions, with supermarket competitive pressure forcing price and margins down. The 'everyday low pricing' strategies used by retailers have kept prices down across many basic categories. Such strategies enable the supermarkets to be seen to be offering value for money when compared to competitors.
Building value in the fresh produce sector is difficult, and price therefore remains the main differentiator for the consumer. Also, the essential nature of some products means that some fruit and vegetables have been vulnerable to retail pricing strategies. However, branding and product differentiation will be of key importance to growth and adding value to the market.
On this evidence, differentiating foods as being local and/or regional could therefore be beneficial to producers when marketing their produce and should enable them to obtain premium prices.
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There is relatively little supplier proprietary branding in the UK fresh produce market. The availability and seasonality of fresh produce make it difficult for supplier branded produce to retain an on-shelf presence. Retailer own-branding has been of key importance to the development strategies of the multiples, who have segmented the fruit and vegetable market with their, for example, good/better/best/organic own-label ranges.
In the UK, supermarkets (both directly and through their intermediaries) set both the agenda and the price for the rest of the supply chain (Hingley, 2005a) . UK Growers feel that the price control exerted by dominant multiple retailers is having a profound effect on their industry, and are again looking to both new markets and external agencies for support on this matter.
In the UK, differentiation takes place in the vertical competitive context. The UK fresh produce supply chain has undergone numerous changes in the last decade, with large supermarket retailers becoming increasingly powerful. The implementation of modern business practices has helped improve efficiency in the UK fresh produce supply chain. This has allowed the chain to break out of the commodity trap and take the fresh produce category out of the commodity trading environment (Fearne and Hughes, 2000: p. 120 ) by means of innovation and value creation (White, 2000) . The overall trend is towards the UK fresh produce industry being dominated by a few large corporations operating on a national level, with some corporations even operating on a European or global scale. Most recently, the takeover of one of the largest UK food retailers, Safeway by Wm. Morrison, has resulted in four major supermarket chains (Tesco, Sainsbury, Wal-Mart-Asda, and Morrisons) accounting for three-quarters of retail grocery sales (IGD, 2005) . Tesco take a third of the value of UK grocery sales alone.
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A further development has been a change from market transactions to market relationships, networks, and interactions (Bourlakis, 2001; Hingley and Lindgreen, 2002; Lindgreen and Hingley, 2003; Lindgreen, 2003; Kotzab, 2001) . From the retailer perspective (and largely initiated by them) has been the development of category management as a key managerial tool (Lindgreen et al., 2000) . O' Keefe and Fearne (2002) , for example, contend that their analysis of the application of category leadership in the fresh produce industry by UK retailer Waitrose shows that it is possible to successfully apply an integrated network-based relationship approach to what was considered to be a commodity sector.
Category management (where a preferred supply takes greater responsibility for the entire supply chain of a given product category) has become universally applied by retailers. The premise is that category management facilitates greater levels of collaboration in vertical supply channels and underpins relationship development (Barnes, McGrath, and Pinnock, 1995) . This occurs where a single (lead) supplier organizes the supply (from all the suppliers) of a given product category to the retailer. However, such initiatives are seen by some to be simply moving risk and cost onto the supplier and away from the retailer (Allen, 2001 ). This is an argument put forward by Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott (2003) who contend that the development of category management has not necessarily increased cooperation in supply chains and can be used by retailers to reinforce power and control.
Retailers are looking for fewer and larger suppliers who can work with them in vertical 'partnership' (Hingley, 2001; White, 2000) . This approach delivers considerable advantages for retailers, in that they can influence entire food channels for given products through singular dyadic interfaces with nominated channel leading intermediaries or 'super-19 middlemen' (Hingley, 2005a) . Reducing the number of points of contact for supply not only derives benefits in terms of transaction cost savings, but also relational benefits in dealing with fewer, but closer 'partner' suppliers. This has resulted in an overriding trend towards supply chain concentration of a market determined by the standards of large-scale retailers.
In Italy, fresh produce accounts for more than the 24 per cent of the total value of agricultural production (valued at prices received by farmers), and contributes to the positive part of the food trade balance sheet; with a self-sufficiency rate equal to 114 per cent. Notwithstanding this positive data, the Italian fresh produce industry is in the middle of a deep crisis. In its last report on the industry the CIA (2006), the main farmers union reported the loss of Italian leadership in the European market. During the last 10 years, the Italian share of the total fresh produce markets of European partners (EU 15) has continuously decreased; meanwhile imports into Italy registered a sharp increase of 56 per cent from the EU-25 and of 112 per cent from outside the EU. The loss of competitiveness has been due to the enduring weakness of production structure (small firms) and to poor logistic structures compared with the recent consolidation and innovation processes within Italy's traditional competitor (Spain) and in the new fresh produce specialised countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey). Also, new entrants to the European fresh produce market like China, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay seem to be stronger on the both levels of structures and organisation.
When asked how to overcome this crisis and recover a leading position in the domestic as well as the export market, farmers associations, experts, and public officers of the Ministry for Agriculture all give three simple answers: horizontal integration at agricultural level for achieving network externalities in the production and selling activities; quality improvement and better exploitation of the comparative advantages Italian producers have with respect 20 weather, natural conditions, and product variety; and better relationships with big retailers that sell more 60 per cent of the production and are the only actors in the distribution channel that actually can 'persuade' consumers to reward the Italian product.
Differentiation strategies by leading supermarkets along with a preference for Italian suppliers could help Italian farmers to exit the crisis. Evidence from both consumers' attitudes and retailers' marketing strategies seem to indicate that this is a practicable way. It is interesting to note also that collaborating growers in Southern-Italy are taking the branding initiative in fresh produce, whereby most recently in Sicily a consortium of Sicilian fruit growers from the Calatino south Simeto District have unveiled a new brand  Puraterra. The name is a reference to the pure soil and the high quality of the organic produce, cultivated on a total area of 100,000 hectares. Blood oranges, grapes, cactus figs, peaches, and artichokes will be supplied under the new brand (Anonymous, 2007) .
A recent survey by INDICOD (http://www.indicod-ecr.it/) on consumer preferences for fresh produce shows at least five notable attitudes:
 As regards product attributes consumers rank this as follows: i. sensory attributes (taste, appearance and smell); ii. price; iii. convenience (time and energy saving in food shopping, storage and preparation disposal); and iv. origin and traceability.
 As regards organic products, almost half of the sample bought these at least once in the last month. Conad) and all increased the offer of IV gamma products (fresh cut, prepared, dressed, and ready-to-eat), with a growing range and larger display.
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Summarising the Italian market for fresh produce, there seems to be split between an unbranded/undifferentiated segment, where sensorial attributes and price are the key leverages of competition; and a highly differentiated/ semi-branded segment, where quality, variety, origin, convenience, and every sort of added value are the keys elements for obtaining premium prices and competitive advantages. The second segment, of course, might be the one interesting for Italian growers struggling to maintain their market shares.
Methodology
It was decided to approach the question of product differentiation in vertical channel structures using a single dyadic case approach, in which a primary producer is engaged in 'partner' supply to a principal category management intermediary for channel leading multiple retailers. It is believed that this constitutes the most appropriate method to emphasise detail, depth, and insight, as well as understanding and explanation (Patton, 1987; Sayre, 2001) . In this research, semi-structured, personal interviews were used allowed in order to facilitate respondents' thoughts, opinions, attitudes, and motivational ideas. The two organisations, which form the key vertical channel interaction, were selected for their ability to contribute new insights, as well as in the expectation that these insights would be replicated (Perry, 1998) . The cases were selected for reasons of being typical examples (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1987) of fresh produce supply (the grower) and fresh produce category management intermediary (the buying and value adding organisation in 'partnership' with multiple retailer customers). Interview questions were standardised around a number of topics (Dibb et al., 1997) . Questions were kept deliberately broad to allow interviewees as much freedom in their answers as possible (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) . The findings are taken from the words of the respondents themselves, thereby aiding the aim of the research, whilst 23 gaining much more information than would have been available from alternative research methods (Corbin and Strauss, 1998) . Within-case analysis involved writing up a summary of each individual case in order to identify important case level phenomena.
The principal areas for exploration identified in the preceding literature are the following two ones: the impact of vertical competition on channel coordination; and competitive advantage through value-adding in vertical chains (cost leadership and differentiation strategies through branding, production and technological systems, and seasonal variation opportunities).
Case Findings
The two halves of the vertical-channel dyad are as follows. FP Marketing (name changed for reasons of anonymity) is the central marketing organisation for its own and associated growers produce against customer programmes and is based in the UK, with an annual sales turnover of over 100 million euros. It coordinates crop production and volumes both in the UK and overseas, and supplies consolidated and value-added (packaged) fresh produce to large multiple retailers in the UK, under retailers' own-label. 90 per cent of their business is in supply to UK multiple retailers, the remainder constitutes product that does not meet retailer specifications, and is marketed to UK wholesalers or processors. The group also has is own transport company. The product range is protected (e.g., glasshouse) fresh produce crops (tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, and so forth) from UK, Northern Europe, and Eastern Europe and the same range from protected/unprotected sources in Southern Europe. The emphasis for this study is on tomato production and marketing, and the vertical relationship of a tomato producer and value-adding intermediary to multiple retailer customers. We have got northern European growers, right the way from Belgium to the UK. We have now expanded into Poland for new sources, and that covers the UK seasonal supply/demand. (FP Marketing) 25 What the category management system does is allow retailers to coordinate category supply through category leaders like FP Marketing. The intermediary organisation benefits from more business, but must take on an enhanced role and associated responsibilities, and this is becoming increasingly expensive for suppliers. However, FP Marketing does see this as part of a (service-based) value-adding process:
We have to provide services; we have to provide more resources. That is our added value to the customer. We supply all that technical (input), the agronomists, the ideas, the trials, the NPD, all of this development. There is not a charge for that. (FP Marketing) Multiple retail chains will specify quality assurance through determination of produce from accredited sources. These are normally European baseline production standards, environmental growing conditions, and so forth; and different customers in different The motivation of FP Marketing is to try to add value to the products it supplies to supermarket customers in order to avoid the 'commodity-trap' of being in an unbranded business, in which retailer own-label is the predominant identity:
In commodity areas supply is far greater than demand and by their nature supermarkets will use that against us. So, we work to try and put identity to products […] and try to add value to it, and try and raise awareness with our customer. We look at varieties and taste, we try not to be in value and standard (retail lines), our ideal aspiration is to be in 'special' In this way, retail customers' (through the expertise and packaging operations of FP Marketing) in the UK are keen to differentiate for both UK and overseas (e.g., southern
Italian) produce as a means of further value-added.
In terms of branding, FP Grower does have a named identity, but as this is mainly used as an identifier on outer cases for wholesale and intermediary customers, brand identity does not appear on-pack at retailer level. If there is pack identity it is with the retailer's own-label brand. FP Grower's customers collect product (using their own transport arrangements) from them at the farm, which is packed 'on demand' to customers' specification. As a result, FP Grower does not benefit from directly attributed brand identity. FP Grower's principal customer, FP Marketing, is responsible for all of the value-adding in terms of packaging and on-pack marketing for UK retail customers. FP Grower puts loose raw material (tomatoes) into plastic returnable trays. This is collected by FP Marketing's own transport to take the produce to the UK. It is there that further value-adding takes place in terms of consolidation, grading, and packing into punnets to the specification of specific retail customers under their brand identity. So, FP Marketing also does not have brand identity on-pack; value-adding for them is derived from the kind of service elements described above (continual sourcing throughout the seasons, new varietal sourcing, consolidation, packaging, new product development, and so forth). This may be a further reason why FP Grower has not developed customer markets dedicated to varietal type, production method, or regional association, as these things are more difficult 30 to achieve without further contractual/collaborative agreements. However, FP Grower is looking to expand through exploiting seasonal gaps with 'UK customers interested in winter production' and to add service value through 'further quality and logistic improvement'. They also have more long-term thoughts about horizontal and vertical integration of their own, through producer collaboration with other growers to sell direct to the public, via retailing of a producer group's own range of produce.
Vertical coordination through a category management type system does have clear advantages for primary producers like FP Grower and intermediaries like FP Marketing, through the consistency of a planned contractual arrangement. As this further develops, this can allow further market differentiation (through, for example, production method or varietal specialisation or emphasis on regional identity). However, control remains firmly in the hands of the multiple retailer customers, whose name and identity value-adding services are conducted in:
Supermarkets are very cute [clever], they outsource some of their work to us. We do their work for them, whether it in inventory, in marketing, in procurement. We are continually doing that, so it is a cost that we are bearing. (FP Marketing) Fresh produce is still very price sensitive and commodity suppliers/supply chains substitutable, and it is easy to enter the commodity fresh produce market in supply to retailers:
It [category management] is very beneficial, but that does not take away from the fact that we live and work in a very marginal [profit] industry. (FP Marketing) 31 But category management-based supply does, in return provide some security, as it allows intermediaries and primary suppliers to add-value through service. Most of the value-adding services are conducted by the intermediary (in this case FP Marketing) and that allows more ownership of the business.
FP Marketing do acknowledge that there may be scope for more of these value adding activities to take place closer to the country and point of production:
If they [growers/grower groups] were able to produce a finished article in Italy, prepacked in a plastic tray, then you (they could) start driving costs out of the business. (FP
Marketing)
From this point Italian growers/grower groups could exploit Italian retail demand for valueadded products:
If it works for us [value-adding] in northern Europe, why should it not work in the home market? And it is closer, the costs are lower, they can deliver into those markets [within Italy] a lot cheaper. (FP Marketing) However, FP Marketing are quick to point out that to supply the retail market outside of Italy, for example the UK, it would be much harder to replace what they do in terms of providing the consolidation (and all that requires in carrying a continual, multi-seasonal and vast range of products and sources); and all of the value-added services that large UK retailers' require.
Concluding Remarks
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The current competitive structure of the food system is such as to give strong incentives to differentiation strategies. Evidences from the economic literature on market differentiation suggest that the degree and the kind of differentiation (vertical/quality versus horizontal/feature) in the food marketing channel will depend on several interplaying factors:
form and preference parameters of the demand function; competitive pressure at vertical and horizontal level; forms of vertical governance structures; and power asymmetries between upstream and downstream firms in the channel. In any case, differentiation is likely to be associated with high degree of concentration and market power.
A theoretical general finding is that equilibria in differentiated markets are not stable and that a welfare assessment is difficult given that the net welfare effect of differentiation depends on the degree of market power (and the associated monopoly inefficiencies) owned by firms at equilibrium, the consumer preferences for differentiated products, and the form of the differentiation cost function.
With regards the market for fresh produce it has been shown that a differentiation strategy in this sector might benefit retailers more than in other sectors, due to the absence of brand policies (and consequently of vertical conflicting strategies) by suppliers. Results from the presented case study seem to be consistent with the theoretical findings. In the sketched marketing channel made of the vertical channel interface between 'FP Grower' and 'FP Marketing' and the final retailer, the retailer is the leading actor of the differentiation policy and the one who mostly benefits from it. In the analysed case, it is identified that higher product differentiation can add value to the channel value. As predicted by the theory, the differentiation strategy can be carried out because the power asymmetry in the channel favour the party (the retailer) who possess the resources (consumer and market segmentation 33 information, economic strength, and managerial skill) required to making the differentiation policy succeed. The theory also predicts that the vertical governance form must be such as to give sufficient incentives to upstream channel partners to comply with the retailer differentiation policy. In the example, the performed annual contractual arrangement gives growers a benefit, in term of sales planning and assurance; which offsets the relationship disadvantages due to the retailer's buying power. The channel organisation also leaves the marketing intermediary (FP Marketing) the right incentives to incur the specific investment requested for the success of the differentiation policy.
A general result of the study is that when retailers engage in product differentiation it is more likely that the terms of channel relationships shift from collaborative to competitive types with the power imbalance becoming the disciplinary means by which vertical coordination is achieved and maintained. As a consequence the relationship marketing idea that channel partners look for equitable collaborative relations seems to be contradicted by the evidence that for suppliers it could be wise agreeing to some inequity as the cost of doing business (Corsten and Kumar, 2005) , especially when smart large retailers carry out successfully competitive strategies with positive spill over effects on the upstream firms. This viewpoint is concurred by Hingley (2005b) and Hingley, Lindgreen, and Casswell (2005) in analysis of fresh food chain supplier-supermarket relationships, where acceptance of channel asymmetry is advocated. Following this, the question to be answered is how much power is allowed for in the system without being a threat for the general social welfare and how to assess the anticompetitive effects of power imbalance in the channel in antitrust contexts?
